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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-BURDEN OF PROOF-INQUIRY AS TO
AUTHORITY OF AGENT.-Defendant made a contract with the United
States for the construction of a public building at Newport, Rhode
Island. Plaintiffs, as subcontractors, agreed in writing with defen-
dant to furnish the stone for the building for a certain sum. During
the progress of the work defendant made payments to plaintiffs in an
amount substantially more than the contract price. After completion
of the work, plaintiffs demanded, by reason of a modification of the
contract, a larger sum than they had received. Their claim is based
on a conversation had with defendant's superintendent of construction
to the effect that they were having too great a difficulty in carrying on
under the existing contract and needed more money. The superin-
tendent of construction, plaintiffs aver, replied to this by saying that
"he would see that they get paid what it was worth to do the job."
Plaintiffs base their argument upon two main points: (1) That defen-
dant's superintendent had authority as an agent to modify the written
contract previously entered into; and (2) that the oral modification
was ratified by defendant. Held, for defendant. Ferro Concrete
Construction Co. v. United States for Use and Benefit of Luchini,
et al., 112 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
To constitute a ratification the principal must have knowledge of
all the material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthorized
act of the person who assumed to act as agent.' According to the
evidence the defendant did not know that the statement had been made
by its construction superintendent until the year following, when a
claim, based upon it, was made by plaintiff which defendant imme-
diately rejected. A party who seeks to charge a principal for the
contracts made by his agent must prove that agent's authority, and it
is not for the principal to disprove it.2 It is an elementary rule of law
that a person dealing with an alleged agent is bound to ascertain his
authority, and that, when suit is brought against the principal in
respect to an act of such agent, the burden is upon the plaintiff to
establish not only the fact of agency but that the act upon which he
relies was within the agent's authority.3  In the instant case the evi-
dence is clear to the effect that, so far as actual express authority of
the superintendent to change the contract was concerned, he had none.
It is also quite clear that no implied authority was conferred upon him
by reason of his being a construction superintendent. The written
contract stated, "Any extra work done under this agreement must be
on written order only and time and material work must be approved
daily by the superintendent or timekeeper of the party of the first part.
Blanks for this purpose will be furnished by the party of the first part
on the job" and "All agreements are subject to the approval of one of
I Williams v. Thrasher. 62 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933), cert. denied on
other grounds, 289 U. S. 748, 53 Sup. Ct. 691 (1933).
2 Schutz v. Jordan, 141 U. S. 213, 11 Sup. Ct. 906 (1891).
3 Owens Bottle-Machine Co. v. Kanawha, 259 Fed. 838 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919).
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the officers of the company." The construction superintendent was
not one of defendant's officers. It is clear under these circumstances
that the alleged agent had no implied authority.4 Furthermore, the
authority he did have, which was to carry out the terms of the written
contract, did not give him implied authority to alter or modify the
same.5 From a power to make an agreement or to perform it or carry
it out no power to cancel or vary it is inferable particularly where a
provision which would be affected by waiver or alteration is one
intended for the benefit of the principal. 6 Presumptively, an agent is
employed to acquire interests, not to give them up.7 The only argu-
able question is whether the evidence showed that such an act was
within the scope of his apparent authority. The court decided plain-
tiffs were placed in a position where they were bound to inquire as to
the extent of the alleged agent's authority.8 It is settled that, where
one contracts with an agent who apparently has a limited rather than a
general authority, he is bound to make inquiry and ascertain the
extent of the agent's authority to act.9 If one has notice that the
authority of an agent is limited, he deals with the agent at his peril.10
Where the nature of the transaction to which an agent purports to
agree is extraordinary, in view of the previous conduct of the agent
with respect to the principal and in view of the circumstances of the
relationship, that is enough to put the person relying on such authority
on inquiry; and as a matter of law the individual is compelled to
inquire of the principal as to the extent of the agent's authority before
4 Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd, 204 Fed. 859 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913), cert. denied
on other grounds, 231 U. S. 745, 34 Sup. Ct. 319 (1913) (Plaintiff company was
to do certain excavation for defendant. Unexpected difficulties were encoun-
tered in that it required plaintiff to excavate a very heavy substance called
"gumbo". The engineers who had charge of the job for defendant were alleged
by plaintiff to have made an- oral agreement that plaintiff should receive more
compensation than provided for in the written contract. The court reversedjudgment for plaintiff on ground that the engineers had no such authority as
would permit them to alter the contract); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Jolly
Bros. & Co., 71 Ohio St. 92, 72 N. E. 888 (1904).
5 Coursey v. Firestone, 33 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Morton v.
Albers Bros. Milling Co., 66 Cal. App. 391, 226 Pac. 809 (1924); Eastern
Advertising Co. v. Standard Nut Co., Inc., 264 Mass. 238, 162 N. E. 339 (1928);
Dudley v. Perkins, 235 N. Y. 448, 139 N. E. 570 (1923).
6 Morton v. Albers Bros. Milling Co., 66 Cal. App. 391, 226 Pac. 809
(1924).
7 Thomas v. Anthony, 30 Cal. App. 217, 157 Pac. 823 (1916) ; Hutchings v.
Munger, 41 N. Y. 155 (1869).
8 The written contract had been made between plaintiffs and an officer of
defendant corporation. Defendant's letterhead contained the following state-
ment: "All agreements are subject to the approval of one of the officers of the
company." Whenever plaintiffs asked for money the request had to be sent to
the home office. One of the officers of defendant corporation "followed the job
very closely."
9 Cauman v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 229 Mass. 278, 118 N. E. 259
(1918).
10 Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 144 Mass. 43, 10 N. E. 518
(1887); Hill v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 164 Mass. 406, 41 N. E.
657 (1895).
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he may iely on it." The general rule is: that one cannot rely on an
agent's assumption, of authority, but one must investigate and ascertain
the nature and extent of the agent's powers.12 Such an agent as
defendant's is by no means a universal agent; but is restricted "to
those acts and contracts usually exercised by other-agents in the same
line of business under similar circumstances, and must conduct the
particular business of the principal in-the manner usually employed by
other agents of the same kind." 13 One dealing with'an agent with
knowledge of limitations on the agent's authority cannot hold the
principal for acts of the agergt outside those limitations.14 A third
person dealing with one known to be an agent is not relieved of all
.obligation in the matter, but is held to the exercise of reasonable pru-
dence, and, if an agent, though a general one, departing fronf'legiti-
mate effort in his employer's interests, tenders a contract so unusual
and remarkable as to arouse the inquiry of a man of average business
prudence, the third party is not allowed to act upon assumptions which
ordinarily obtain; he is put upon notice and must ascertain if actual
authority has been conferred. Any substantial departure by an agent
from the usual methods of -conducting business is ordinarily a suffi-
cient warning of lack of authorization.15 The person dealing with the
agent should ascertain the extent of his authority from the principal or
from some other person who will have a motive to tell the truth in the
interests of the principal, and he cannot rely upon the agent's state-
ment or assumption of authority or upon the mere presumption of
authority.1
R. E..B..
SCHOOL BOARDs-DIsciToNARY POWER-APPOINTMENT OF
PROFESSORS-JUDICIAL REviEw.-The petitioner, a citizen and tax-
payer of the City of New York, seeks an order under Article 78 of
the New York Civil Practice Act 1 revoking the appointment of Dr.
Bertrand Russell by the Board of Higher Education of the City of
New York to the Chair of Philosophy in the College of the City of
New York and discharging the appointee from said position. The
21 Hill v. James, 148 Minn. 261, 181 N. W. 577 (1921).
12 W. W. Marshall & Co. v. Kirschbraun & Sons, 100 Neb. 876, 161 N. W.
577 (1917).
"3 A. H. Stephens v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 107, 109, 75
S. E. 933, 939 (1912).
14 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Coughlin, 40 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930).
15 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1932) § 166a.
'
6 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Potomac Builder's Supply 'Co., 61 F.
(2d) 407 (App. D. C. 1932).
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac-r § 1283.
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